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ABSTRACT
Today’s IoT systems include event-driven smart applications (apps)
that interact with sensors and actuators. A problem specific to IoT
systems is that buggy apps, unforeseen bad app interactions, or
device/communication failures, can cause unsafe and dangerous
physical states. Detecting flaws that lead to such states, requires a
holistic view of installed apps, component devices, their configura-
tions, and more importantly, how they interact. In this paper, we
design IotSan, a novel practical system that uses model checking
as a building block to reveal “interaction-level” flaws by identifying
events that can lead the system to unsafe states. In building IotSan,
we design novel techniques tailored to IoT systems, to alleviate
the state explosion associated with model checking. IotSan also
automatically translates IoT apps into a format amenable to model
checking. Finally, to understand the root cause of a detected vulner-
ability, we design an attribution mechanism to identify problematic
and potentially malicious apps. We evaluate IotSan on the Sam-
sung SmartThings platform. From 76 manually configured systems,
IotSan detects 147 vulnerabilities. We also evaluate IotSan with
malicious SmartThings apps from a previous effort. IotSan detects
the potential safety violations and also effectively attributes these
apps as malicious.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A variety of IoT (Internet-of-Things) systems are already widely
available on the market. These systems are typically controlled by
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event-driven smart apps that take as input either sensed data, user
inputs, or other external triggers (from the Internet) and command
one or more actuators towards providing different forms of automa-
tion. Examples of sensors include smoke detectors, motion sensors,
and contact sensors. Examples of actuators include smart locks,
smart power outlets, and door controls. Popular control platforms
on which third-party developers can build smart apps that inter-
act wirelessly with these sensors and actuators include Samsung’s
SmartThings [74], Apple’s HomeKit [4], and Amazon’s Alexa [3],
among others.
While conceivably, IoT is here to stay, current research studies on
security/safety of IoT systems are limited in two fronts. First, they
focus on individual components of IoT systems: there are papers
on the security of communication protocols [25, 32, 41, 58, 71, 76],
firmware of devices [1, 16, 22, 73, 83, 92], platforms [29, 52], and
smart apps [28, 29, 52, 85]. Very few efforts have taken a holistic
perspective of an IoT system. Second, most current research efforts
only focus on securing the cyberspace, and do not address the safety
and security of the physical space, which is one of the key obstacles
for real-world IoT deployment [7, 61].
Our thesis is that a holistic view of an IoT system is important
i.e., the distributed sensors and actuators, and the apps that interact
with them need to be considered jointly. While the compromise
of an individual component may lead to the compromise of the
whole system, certain complex security and safety issues are only
revealed when the interactions between components (e.g., a plural-
ity of poorly designed apps) and/or possible device/communication
failures are considered. These latent problems are very real since
apps are often developed by third-party vendors without coordi-
nation, and are likely to be installed by one or more users (e.g.,
family members) at different times. Moreover, both legitimate de-
vice failures [30, 34, 88, 90] (e.g., from battery depletion) and induced
communication failures (e.g., via jamming [70]) can lead to missed
interactions between autonomous components, which in turn can
cause the entire system to transition into a bad state. These issues
are especially dangerous, because bad or missed interactions can
be deliberately induced by attackers via spoofing sensors [78, 81],
luring users to install malicious apps [52], or jamming sensor re-
ports.
Goals: In this paper, our goal is to build a holistic system which,
given an IoT system and a set of default plus user-defined safety
properties with regards to both the cyber and physical spaces, (a)
finds if components of an IoT system or interactions between com-
ponents can lead to bad states that violate these properties; and,
(b) attributes the detected violations to either benign misconfigura-
tions or potential malicious apps. With regards to (a) we account for
cases wherein app interactions or failed device(s)/communications
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can cause a bad state. With regards to (b) we look for repeated
instantiations of unsafe states since malicious apps are likely to
consistently try to coerce the IoT system into exploitable bad states
(e.g., those described in [52]).
To achieve our goal, we need to solve a set of technical challenges.
Among these, the key challenge lies in the scope of the analysis:
as the number of IoT devices and apps is already large and is only
likely to grow in the future [36, 50], physical replication and testing
of IoT systems is hard (due to scale). Thus, it is desirable to build
a realistic model of the system, which captures the interactions
between sensors, apps, and actuators.
Our solution: We achieve our goal by addressing the above and
other practical challenges, in a novel framework IotSan (for IoT
Sanitizer). In brief, IotSan uses model checking as a basic building
block. Towards alleviating the state space explosion problem associ-
ated with model checking [19], we design two optimizations within
IotSan to (i) only consider apps that interact with each other, and
(ii) eliminate unnecessary interleaving that is unlikely to yield use-
ful assessment of unsafe behaviors. We also design an attribution
module which flags potentially malicious apps, and attributes other
unsafe states to bad design or misconfiguration.
We develop a prototype of IotSan based on the Spin model
checker [44] and apply it to the Samsung SmartThings platform.
As one contribution, we design an automated model generator that
translates apps written in Groovy (the programming language of
SmartThings apps) into Promela, the modeling language of Spin. To
evaluate IotSan, we postulate 45 common sense safety properties
and consider 150 smart apps with 76 configurations. With this setup,
IotSan discovered 147 violations of 20 safety properties due to app
interactions (135 violations) and device/communication failures (12
violations). In an extreme case, 4 smart apps needed to interact to
cause a violation, which is extremely difficult to spot manually. We
evaluate our attribution module with 9 malicious apps from [52]
that are relevant to our problem scope (e.g., causing bad physical
states). IotSan attributes all 9 apps to be potentially malicious.
A summary of our contributions is as follows:
• We map the problem of detecting potential safety issues of an
IoT system into a model checking problem. We develop novel
pre-processing methods to alleviate the state explosion problem
in model checking.
• We design IotSan to detect safety violations in IoT systems and
develop a prototype that applies to the Samsung SmartThings
platform. We provide the source code of IotSan for download
at https://github.com/dangtunguyen/IoTSan 1. We develop tools
to automatically translate the app source code into Promela. We
evaluate IotSan with 150 smart apps from the SmartThings’
market place and discover 147 possible safety violations.
• We propose a method to attribute safety violations to either
bad apps or misconfigurations. The method attributes 9 known
malicious apps with 100% accuracy.
2 BACKGROUND AND SYNOPSIS
Today’s IoT systems [3, 4, 49, 57, 64, 74, 87] typically consist of three
major components viz., (i) a hub and the IoT devices it controls,
1A more detailed technical report is also available at this site.
(ii) a platform (can be the hub, a cloud backend, or a combination)
where smart apps execute, and (iii) a companion mobile app and/or
a web-based app to configure and control the system. Without
loss of generality, we design IotSan assuming this underlying
architecture. Therefore, although the implementation of IotSan is
tailored to the SmartThings platform given its recent popularity,
[14, 15, 28, 29, 52, 85], conceptually IotSan is also applicable to
other IoT platforms. We use the term “IoT system" to refer to those
used in smart homes as in recent papers such as [14, 15, 28, 29,
52, 85] for ease of exposition; however, our approach can apply to
other application scenarios (e.g., IoT based enterprise deployments
or manufacturing systems [24, 46, 59, 65]).
2.1 Samsung SmartThings
Overview: Like the other systems mentioned above, SmartThings
has an associated hub and a companion mobile app, that com-
municate with a cloud backend via the Internet, using the SSL
protocol [6]. Developers can create smart apps using the Groovy
programming language. The platform and apps interact with de-
vices through device handlers; written in Groovy, these are virtual
representations of physical devices that expose the devices’ ca-
pabilities. To publish a device handler, a developer needs to get a
certificate from Samsung. Typically, smart apps and device handlers
are executed in the SmartThings cloud backend inside sandboxes.
Programming model: A smart app subscribes to events gen-
erated by device handlers (e.g., motion detected) and/or controls
some actuators using method calls (e.g., turn on a bulb). Smart apps
can also send SMS and make network calls using the SmartThings’
APIs. A smart app can discover and connect to devices, in two ways.
Typically, at installation time, the companion app shows a list of
supported devices to a user; after configuration, the list of the user’s
chosen devices are returned to the app. The second (lesser-known)
way is that SmartThings provides APIs that allow apps to query
all the devices connected to the hub. Besides subscribing to de-
vice events, smart apps can also register callbacks for events from
external services (e.g., IFTTT [47]) and timers.
Communications: The hub communicates with IoT devices
using a protocol such as ZWave or ZigBee. Experiments using
the EZSync CC2531 Evaluation Module USB Dongle [48] of Texas
Instruments, reveal that the ZigBee implementation in SmartThings
supports four (single hop) MAC layer retransmissions. In addition,
SmartThings has an application support sublayer that performs
15 end-to-end retransmissions (for a total of 60 retransmissions
of a packet). These are in line with ZigBee specifications as also
verified in [2, 9, 54, 60]. Thus, typically, it is rare that the system
will transition to unsafe states because of benign packet losses.
2.2 Misconfiguration Problems
Besides malicious apps, misconfiguration is a common cause for
safety violations. When installing a smart app, a user has to con-
figure the app with sensor(s) and actuator(s). Poor configurations
can transition the IoT system to unsafe physical states. There are
many common causes for such misconfigurations, e.g., (i) the app’s
description is unclear, (ii) there are too many configuration options,
and (iii) normal users often do not have good domain knowledge
to clearly understand the behaviors of smart devices and smart
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1 preferences {
2 sec t ion ( "Choose a temperature sensor ... " ) {
3 input "sensor" , "capability.temperatureMeasurement" , t i t l e :
"Sensor"
4 }
5 sec t ion ( "Select the heater or air conditioner outlet(s)... " ) {
6 input "outlets" , "capability.switch" , t i t l e : "Outlets" ,
multiple : true
7 }
8 sec t ion ( "Set the desired temperature ..." ) {
9 input "setpoint" , "decimal" , t i t l e : "Set Temp"
10 }
11 sec t ion ( "When there's been movement from (optional)" ) {
12 input "motion" , "capability.motionSensor" , t i t l e : "Motion" ,
required : f a l s e
13 }
14 sec t ion ( "Within this number of minutes ..." ) {
15 input "minutes" , "number" , t i t l e : "Minutes" , required : f a l s e
16 }
17 sec t ion ( "But never go below (or above if A/C) this value with
or without motion ..." ) {
18 input "emergencySetpoint" , "decimal" , t i t l e : "Emer Temp" ,
required : f a l s e
19 }
20 sec t ion ( "Select 'heat' for a heater and 'cool' for an air
conditioner ..." ) {
21 input "mode" , "enum" , t i t l e : "Heating or cooling?" , options :
[ "heat" , "cool" ]
22 }
23 }
Figure 1: Example of input info needed from users to config-
ure the app Virtual Thermostat.
apps. To exemplify these issues, we conduct a user study (more
details in §10) where we asked 7 student volunteers to configure
various apps as they deemed fit. Among these apps, one app is
called Virtual Thermostat and describes itself as “Control a space
heater or window air conditioner (AC) in conjunction with any
temperature sensor, like a SmartSense Multi.” Figure 1 shows the in-
puts needed from a user, which include a temperature measurement
sensor (lines 2-4), the power outlets into which the heater or the
AC are plugged (lines 5-7), a desired temperature (lines 8-10), etc.
Although the developers use the word or and the app only expects
either a heater or an AC, 5 out of 7 student volunteers thought
the app controls both a heater and an AC to maintain the desired
temperature and mis-configured the app to control both the AC
outlet and the heater outlet. To exacerbate the confusion, the app
expects the configuration of outlets (capability.switch) instead
of the actual devices that are plugged into the outlets (i.e., AC or
heater) (note that the SmartThings UI displays all available out-
lets to the user). As a result of volunteer misconfigurations, when
the temperature is higher than a predefined threshold, the Virtual
Thermostat would turn on both the configured outlets (i.e., both the
heater and the AC). This violates the following two commonsense
properties: (i) a heater is turned on when temperature is above a
predefined threshold and (ii) an AC and a heater are both turned
on.
2.3 Model Checking as a Building Block
The problem of reasoning if andwhy the IoT system could transition
into a bad physical state is challenging because the number of apps
and devices is likely to grow in the future and thus, analyzing all
Sensor ActuatorPhysical events (e.g., temperature 
up, motion)
AppEvent in cyber
Command 
in cyber
Event in cyber
Physical events (e.g., temperature 
down, humidity increase)
Figure 2: Chain of events in an IoT system.
possible interactions between them will be hard. Static analysis
tools tend to sacrifice completeness for soundness, and thus result
in lots of false positives. In contrast, typical dynamic analyses tools
verify the properties of a program during execution, but can lead
to false negatives.
Model checking is a technique that checks whether a system
meets a given specification [51], by systematically exploring the
program’s state. In an ideal case, the model checker exhaustively
examines all possible system states to verify if there is any viola-
tion of specifications relating to safety and/or liveness properties.
However, the complexity of modern system software makes this
extremely challenging computationally. So in practice, when the
goal is to find bugs, a model checker is usually used as a falsifier i.e.,
it explores a portion of the reachable state space and tries to find a
computation that violates the specified property. This is sometimes
also called bounded model checking [11, 21, 27, 53, 62].
We adopt model checking as a basic building block since: (i) it
provides the flexibility towards verifying all the desired proper-
ties with linear temporal logic2, (ii) it provides concrete counter-
examples [5, 82] which are very useful in analyzing why and how
the bad states occur, (iii) its holistic nature of checking can cap-
ture interactions among multiple apps, and (iv) it is more efficient
than exhaustive testing [10]. However, a successful model checker
must address the state explosion problem, i.e., the state space could
become unwieldy and requires exponential time to explore.
Given its popularity and flexibility in modelling both concurrent
and synchronous systems [18, 26, 55], we use Spin [44] for checking
if a given set of safety properties can be possibly violated. Since
an IoT system may be composed of a large number of apps and
smart devices, we use Spin’s verification mode with BITSTATE
hashing—an approximate technique that stores the hash code of
states in a bitfield instead of storing the whole states. Although
the BITSTATE hashing technique does not provide a complete
verification, empirical results and theoretical analysis have proved
its effectiveness in terms of state coverage [13, 17, 42, 43, 45].
3 SCOPE AND THREAT MODEL
In this work, our goal is to detect safety issues (i.e., vulnerabilities)
of IoT systems that are exploitable by attackers to transition the
system into bad physical states or leak sensitive information. Safety
requirements (i.e., definition of bad states and information leakage)
can come from both the users and security experts. Examples of
bad physical states are (i) the front door is unlocked when no one
is at home, and (ii) a heater is turned off when the temperature is
below a predefined threshold. With regards to information leak-
age we require that: (i) private information is sent out via only
2 Linear temporal logic (LTL) is a modal temporal logic with modalities referring to
time. LTL is used to verify properties of reactive systems [5].
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message interfaces (e.g., sendSmsMessage and sendPushMessage in
SmartThings) but not via network interfaces (e.g., httpPost in Smart-
Things), and (ii) the recipients of methods for sending messages
match the configured phone numbers or contacts. We point out
that legitimate apps might use network interfaces to send some
control information (e.g., relating to crashes) back to the server. In
such cases, we assume that users dictate whether to allow/disallow
such operations (based on their privacy preferences).
We consider all devices (hub, sensors, and actuators), the cloud,
and the companion app as our trusted computing base (TCB), and
do not consider software attacks against them. However, IotSan
does mitigate physical attacks that can inject event(s) into the sys-
tem (e.g., by physically increasing the temperature or spoofing the
sensors) or maliciously induced device or communication failures
(e.g., by jamming [70]). IotSan seeks to identify and prevent such
events from leading the system into safety violations. However,
targeted solutions to those attacks (e.g., preventing spoofing of
sensors or jamming mitigation) are out-of-scope.
We also consider potential bad states that can arise due to natural
device failures. Note that many users have reported the failures of
their ZigBee and Z-Wave IoT devices (e.g., motion sensors, water
leak sensors, presence sensors, and garage door openers) in the
SmartThings Community [30, 34, 88, 90]. Failures could also result
from device batteries running out. We seek to identify if such device
failures can cause an IoT system to transition into a bad physical
state.
Malicious apps can exploit weaknesses in the configuration and
attack other apps by introducing problematic events. We only seek
to attribute an app as possibly malicious and leave the confirmation
to human experts or other systems.
4 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 2 illustrates a high level view of the chain of events in an
IoT system. In brief, sensors sense the physical world and convert
them into events in the cyber world; these events, in turn, are
passed onto apps that subscribe to such events. Upon processing
the cyber events these apps may output commands to actuators,
which then trigger new physical or cyber events. Apps may also
directly generate new cyber events. Therefore, a single event could
lead to a large sequence of subsequent cyber/physical events.
Figure 3 depicts the architecture of our system IotSan. It con-
sists of five modules viz., App Dependency Analyzer, Translator,
Configuration Extractor, Model Generator, and Output Analyzer. In
designing IotSan, we tackle two main challenges: (i) alleviating
the state space explosion with model checking [19] for our context,
and (ii) the translation of smart apps’ source code to Promela (to
facilitate model checking). We address the first problem partially
in the App Dependency Analyzer and partially in the Model Genera-
tor. The second problem is handled partially in the Translator and
partially in the Model Generator.
App Dependency Analyzer (§ 5): This module constructs de-
pendency graphs to capture interactions between event handlers of
different apps and identifies handlers that must be jointly analyzed
by the model checker. This precludes the unnecessary analysis of
unrelated event handlers.
IoTSan
Model Generator
App Dependency 
Analyzer
Model Checker 
(SPIN)
Output 
Analyzer
Translator
Apps’ 
code 
Verification 
Result
Grey boxes are existing modules/packages
Apps’ 
configurations
Configuration 
Extractor
User-defined 
properties
Figure 3: IotSan architecture overview.
Table 1: Comparison of IotSan and related work.
Feature SIFT
[56]
DeLorean
[23]
Soteria
[15]
IotSan
Detects physical safety violations
Detects information leakage
Detects violations due to communica-
tion/device failures
Detects violations due to misconfiguration
problems
Handles complex code beyond IFTTT rules
Performs violation attribution
Accounts for app interactions
Translator (§ 6): We build a translator within IotSan, that au-
tomatically converts Groovy programs into Promela. In doing so,
we address the following challenges:
• Implicit Types. In Groovy programs, data types of variables and
return types of functions are not explicitly declared. To solve this
problem, we design an algorithm to infer data types of variables
and return types of functions.
• Built-in Utilities. Groovy has many built-in utilities, e.g., find,
findAll, each, collect, first, + on list types, and map. We
manually analyzed the behavior of each utility and translated
them into corresponding code in Promela.
Configuration Extractor (§ 7): IoT platforms often provide a
companion mobile app and/or web-based app to manage/config-
ure the installed smart apps and devices of an IoT system. This
module automatically extracts the system’s configurations from
the manager app.
Model Generator (§ 8): This module takes the Promela code
of event handlers, the configuration of the IoT system, and safety
properties (both pre-defined and user-defined) as inputs, and creates
the Promela model of the system.We use sequential design to model
the IoT system instead of concurrent design. This significantly
reduces the problem size by eliminating unnecessary interleaving
that is unlikely to yield useful assessment of unsafe behaviors. The
generated model is checked by Spin for possible property violations.
Output Analyzer (§ 9): This module analyzes the verification
logs and attributes safety violations to potentially malicious apps,
bad designs or misconfiguration. Based on the result, it provides
the user, a suggestion to either remove a bad app(s) or change an
app(s)’s configuration.
Our work in perspective: IotSan can be envisioned as a ser-
vice that jointly considers the apps, devices and their configurations
of an IoT system, and checks whether a set of a priori defined prop-
erties hold. In addition to detecting safety violations of the physical
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3app/touch lock/unlocked 5app/touch
switch
/on
2
4
presence/“…”
location/
mode
lock/
unlocked
6
switch
/on
0
contact/
open
switch/on
illuminance
/“…” 1
contact/“…”
switch/onswitch/off
(a) Dependency graph.
3 2 4location/mode
2 location/mode 1
switch
/off6 switch/on 1
switch
/off5 switch/on
1switch/off0 switch/on
(b) Related sets (each box represents a related set).
Figure 4: Example of a dependency graph and its correspond-
ing related sets.
space, it also detects information leakage. Finally, it also determines
if communication/device failures can cause unsafe states and de-
tects violations due to misconfiguration problems. In Table 1 we
show the features that IotSan offers compared to the most related
recent systems. A discussion of related work is deferred to § 12.
5 APP DEPENDENCY ANALYZER
The model checker should not have to check the interactions be-
tween event handlers that do not interact. To find event handlers
that can interact and thus jointly influence actuator actions, this
module constructs a dependency graph (DG).
Extracting input/output events: Each smart app registers one
or more event handlers that get notified of events to which it has
subscribed. An event handler takes one or more input events, and
can induce zero or more output events. Input events are (i) explicitly
declared in the subscribe commands or, (ii) identified via APIs
that read states of smart devices, or (iii) indicated by interrupts at
specific times defined by schedulemethod calls. Output events are
invoked via APIs that change states of smart devices. We enumerate
the input and output events of an app using static analysis (details
are straightforward and are omitted to save space).
Dependency Graph Construction:Once the input and output
events are identified, we construct a directed DG as follows. Each
event handler is denoted by a vertex in the DG. An edge from a
vertex u to a vertex v (u → v) is added if the output events of
u overlap with the input events of v . u is then called the parent
vertex of the child vertex v . The vertices in a strongly connected
component are merged into a composite vertex (a union of input
and output events). A leaf vertex does not have any child.
Example: To illustrate, consider the following example. Table 2
summarizes the event handlers and the associated input/output
events with a set of sample smart apps. The description of an event
is in the format attribute/event type (e.g., contact/open means “a
contact sensor is open"); empty quotes (“...") denote “any" event of
that type. Given these apps, we show theDG that is built in Figure 4a.
For each vertex, the incoming arrows denote input events and the
outgoing arrows denote output events. For example, vertex 2 has
two children viz., vertex 4 and vertex 6; all vertices except vertex 2
are leaf vertices.
Related sets: The initial related set of a leaf vertex v ∈ DG
includes all of its ancestors and v itself. There is no need to find
such related sets for vertices that are not leaves, since those sets
are subsets of other leaves’ related sets. Table 3a shows the initial
related sets in the DG from Figure 4a.
The initial related sets constructed as above are incomplete. This
is because, two vertices u and v may have common output events
but the types of these events could be different or what we call
conflicting. For example, nodes 0 and 1 have conflicting output
events viz., switch/off and switch/on. In such cases, the related
sets to which u and v belong, must be merged to account for such
conflicts. Table 3b shows the related sets of vertices with potential
output conflicts in our example. Note here that to check for such
output conflicts, we need to examine O(E2) links in the worst case
(given E output edges from the event handlers); our experiments
show that such checks are very fast.
We point out that if a related set i is a subset of a bigger related
set j, the model checker automatically verifies i when j is verified;
thus, there is no need to re-verify i . In Table 3c and Figure 4b, we
show the final related sets associated with the DG in Figure 4a
after removing all redundant subsets. These related sets are jointly
analyzed by the model checker.
6 TRANSLATOR
Given its popularity and ease of use [33, 35, 77, 84], we build IotSan
using the Bandera Tool Set [38, 39], which is a collection of program
analysis, transformation, and visualization components designed to
apply model-checking to verify Java source code. Bandera generates
a program model and specification in the language of one of several
existing model-checking tools (including Spin, dSpin, SMV, JPF).
When a model-checker produces an error trail, Bandera renders
the error trail at the source code level and allows the user to step
through the code along the path of the trail while displaying values
of variables and internal states of Java lock objects [38, 39].
Since Bandera does not handle Groovy code, in order to analyze
smart apps for SmartThings, we need to convert their code into
Java which is challenging for the following reasons. First, since
SmartThings added several language features to Groovy to sim-
plify smart app development, the standard Groovy compiler cannot
directly process an app’s code and SmartThings’s compiler is not
open sourced. Second, Groovy uses dynamic typing [37] (i.e., data
types are checked at run-time) but Java is static typed (i.e., data
types are explicitly declared and checked at compile-time). Thus,
we need to perform type inference during the translation of Groovy
into Java. Lastly, Groovy supports many built-in utilities such as
list and map, not supported by Bandera (i.e., Bandera supports only
Java’s array type).
The key component we develop is the G2J Translator (see Fig-
ure 5), which translates the smart app Groovy source into Java’s
Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs). In addition, the SmartThings Handler
is designed to handle the new language syntaxes introduced by
SmartThings, and the GParser parses the regular Groovy source
code into Groovy ASTs. Basically, each smart app in Groovy is
translated into a Java class, whose method comprises of a method’s
header and a block of statements. The translation procedure of a
block is straightforward: iterate through the statement list of the
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Table 2: An example to showcase the construction of a dependency graph.
App’s Name Event Handler Vertex’s ID Input Events Output Events
Brighten Dark Places contactOpenHandler 0 contact/open, illuminance/“..." switch/on
Let There Be Dark! contactHandler 1 contact/“..." switch/on, switch/off
Auto Mode Change presenceHandler 2 presence/“..." location/mode
Unlock Door appTouch 3 app/touch lock/unlockedchangedLocationMode 4 location/mode lock/unlocked
Big Turn On appTouch 5 app/touch switch/onchangedLocationMode 6 location/mode switch/on
Table 3: Related sets of the dependency graph in Figure 4a:
(a) Initial related sets, (b) Potential conflicting sets, and (c)
Final related sets.
(a)
Set Vertexes
1 0
2 1
3 3
4 5
5 2, 4
6 2, 6
(b)
Set Vertexes
1 0, 1
2 1, 5
3 1, 2, 6
(c)
Set Vertexes
1 3
2 2, 4
3 0, 1
4 1, 5
5 1, 2, 6
BanderaIoTSan
G2J Translator Java Front-end
BIR 
Constructor
JimpleBack-ends
SPIN Trans
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Figure 5: IotSan is built around Bandera.
input Groovy block, translate each Groovy statement into Java,
add the result to a list of Java statements, and build a Java block
from the result list. To implement these, we extended the Groovy
compiler (org.codehaus.groovy) which is then integrated into the
Bandera’s front-end.
Handling SmartThings’ language features: There are sev-
eral new language syntaxes introduced in SmartThings. Our Smart-
Things Handler parses these new syntaxes and converts them into
vanilla Groovy code using specifications based on the domain
knowledge of SmartThings. For instance, (as can be seen in in
Figure 1) each input function defines a global variable (or a class
field) of the app. Therefore, we traverse the Groovy’s AST of the app
and visit all input functions to extract all global variables of the app.
In addition, apps can use some predefined objects or variables (e.g.,
location) and APIs (e.g., setLocationMode), which are not defined
in vanilla Groovy. Therefore, we manually add definitions of these
global objects.
Type inference: Although the Groovy Compiler org.codehaus.
groovy already has a sub-package CompileStatic for performing
static type inference, it only works when the argument type and
1 pr ivate onSwi t ches ( ) {
2 sw i t c h e s + onSwi tches
3 }
(a) Groovy’s code
1 pr ivate STSwitch [ ] onSwi tches ( ) {
2 STSwitch [ ] STSwitchArr0 ;
3 in t a r r I n d e x 0 = 0 ;
4 in t i ndex3 = 0 ;
5 while ( i ndex3 < TheB igSwi t ch_sw i t che s . l e ng t h ) {
6 STSwitch i t = TheB igSwi t ch_sw i t che s [ index3 ] ;
7 STSwitchArr0 [ a r r I n d e x 0 ] = i t ;
8 a r r I n d e x 0 ++ ;
9 index3 ++ ;
10 }
11 in t i ndex4 = 0 ;
12 while ( i ndex4 < TheBigSwi t ch_onSwi tches . l e ng t h ) {
13 STSwitch i t = TheB igSwi t ch_onSwi t ches [ index4 ] ;
14 STSwitchArr0 [ a r r I n d e x 0 ] = i t ;
15 a r r I n d e x 0 ++ ;
16 index4 ++ ;
17 }
18 return STSwitchArr0 ;
19 }
(b) Corresponding Java’s code
Figure 6: Example of translating a Groovy method into the
corresponding Java’s method.
the return type of a method are given. In other words, a variable
declared inside amethod can take different runtime types depending
on the argument type. Thus, we still need to infer the argument and
return type statically. To do so, we consult the calling context of
each method invocation by recursively tracking the arguments and
return values to their corresponding anchor points—declaration of
variables with explicit types (Groovy supports static typing as well),
assignment to constant values (e.g., we can infer that the type of
variable a is numeric from def a = 0), assignment to return values of
known APIs, and known objects and their properties. The inference
procedure works roughly as follows. When traversing the AST of a
method, we store the names and data types of variables at anchor
points; the types of other variables are inferred by propagating the
types from anchor points. This is done iteratively until we find no
more new variables whose type can be inferred.
HandlingGroovy’s built-in utilities: Another challenge arises
when we translate Groovy into Java for use with Bandera. We find
that Bandera understands only a very basic set of Java. For instance,
it supports only thearray type natively. In contrast, Groovy’s collec-
tion types (e.g.,Collection, List , ArrayList , Set ,Map, and HashSet )
all need to be translated into Java’s array type. We support the
popular collection types that are commonly used in smart apps. An
example is shown in Figure 6 that translates one Groovy list into a
corresponding Java implementation using array. Since the type of
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switches and onSwitches is List of STSwtich, we infer the return type
of onSwitches() method as List of STSwtich, which is translated into
Java’s array type (i.e., STSwitch[]). The + operation on List type
(line 2 in Figure 6a) is automatically translated into corresponding
Java’s code (lines 2-17 in Figure 6b). Finally, since this method is a
non-void method, we add an explicit return statement (line 18 in
Figure 6b).
7 CONFIGURATION EXTRACTOR
IoT platforms typically provide a mobile companion app and/or a
web-based app to manage and configure smart apps and devices.
For Samsung SmartThings, we develop a crawler in Java, using the
Jsoup package to automatically extract the system’s configuration
from the management web app [80]. Given a SmartThings account
(user’s name and password), the crawler logs in to the management
web app and extracts (i) installed devices, (ii) installed smart apps,
and (iii) configurations of apps. Moreover, whenever a user installs
a new generic smart device (e.g., a smart power outlet), we have an
interface to get the device association info (e.g., this new outlet is
used to control an AC) from the user. The extracted configuration
is then saved to a file and used later by the Model Generator. The
process is straightforward and we omit the details in the interest of
space.
8 MODEL GENERATOR
Modeling an IoT system: To correctly verify safety properties, we
need to model two key components (not part of the app code): (i) the
IoT platform and its interactions with smart apps and (ii) IoT devices
and their interactionswith smart apps. IoT platforms [3, 4, 47, 64, 74]
typically provide apps with some methods to register callback func-
tions (i.e., event handlers). Based on apps’ configurations provided
by the Configuration Extractor, we model these special registration
functions so as to invoke callbacks at appropriate times.
We model IoT devices (sensors and actuators) as per their specifi-
cations. Note that both sensors and actuators can generate events of
interest to apps. For instance, a motion sensor can generate motion
active/inactive events whereas a door lock (actuator) can generate
status update events (locked/unlocked). Each device is modeled as
having an event queue and a set of notifiers to inform the smart
apps that have subscribed to specific types of events. Currently, we
support 30 different IoT devices. Note here that we model events
generated by the environment (e.g., sunrise and sunset ) as sensor
generated inputs and location mode changes (e.g., Home , Away,
and Niдht ) as actuations; thus inputs such as users leaving home
(sensed input) can trigger the mode to change from Home to Away
(actuation).
We model system time as a monotonically increasing variable.
We extract the triggering times and callback functions from the
scheduling method calls. The callback functions are then triggered
at appropriate times based on the value of the modeled system time.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo code of the main process that
models behaviors of an IoT system. The model checker enumerates
all possible permutations of the input physical events up to a max-
imum number of events per user’s configuration to exhaustively
verify the system. At each iteration, a sensor and a corresponding
physical event in the permutation space are selected (line 2). Then,
Algorithm 1Modeling an IoT system
1: for i = 1 to maximum number of events do {Main event loop of an IoT
system}
2: Select a sensor and a corresponding event in the permutation space
{Generate a physical event}
3: sensor_state_update(evt)
4: while any event pending do
5: dispatch_event(evt) {Dispatch the pending event to the subscribed
apps and invoke the corresponding app_event_handler(evt) to process
the event}
6: end while
7: end for
{sensor_state_update(evt)}
8: if evt , current state of the sensor then
9: Add the evt to the event queue
10: Update the state of the sensor
11: Notify the subscribers of the state change event
12: end if
{app_event_handler(evt)}
13: if some conditions hold then
14: Send some command to some actuator {Invoke actua-
tor_state_update(evt), which may subsequently generate some
new event}
15: end if
{actuator_state_update(evt)}
16: Verify conflicting and repeated commands violations
17: if evt , current state of the actuator then
18: Add the evt to the event queue
19: Update the state of the actuator
20: Notify the subscribers of the state change event
21: end if
Table 4: Sample safe physical states.
Category Number of
properties
Sample property
Thermostat, AC, and
Heater
5 Temperature should be within a predefined
range when people are at home
Lock and door control 8 The main door should be locked when no
one is at home
Location mode 3 Location mode should be changed to Away
when no one is at home
Security and alarming 14 An alarm should strobe/siren when detect-
ing smoke
Water and sprinkler 3 Soil moisture should be within a predefined
range
Others 5 Some devices should not be turned onwhen
no one is at home
the selected sensor updates its state and event queue, and notifies
its subscribers of the state change event (line 3). When an event
is pending, it is dispatched to the subscribed apps and the corre-
sponding event handlers of apps are invoked to handle the event
(lines 4-6). Each event handler may send some commands to some
actuators, which may generate some new cyber events and trigger
event handlers of the subscribers.
To model natural or induced (e.g., using jamming [70]) device/-
communication failures, when generating a sensor event we enu-
merate two scenarios: (i) the sensor is available/online and (ii) the
sensor is unavailable/offline. Similarly, whenever receiving a com-
mand from a smart app, an actuator may be either online or offline.
If a device is offline, it will not change its state and hence not broad-
cast a state change event to its subscribers. If a device is online,
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the communication (i.e., sending a state change event or receiv-
ing a command) between the device and the hub/cloud may either
succeed or fail (we enumerate both cases).
Concurrency Model: Since an app’s event handler is only trig-
gered by the subscribed event(s) and event handlers of different
apps do not share any global variable [3, 4, 47, 64, 74], the execu-
tion of an app’s event handler can be considered as atomic. This
means that the concurrency level of a model only depends on the
interleaving of apps’ event handlers. To model a concurrent IoT
system therefore, we only need to verify the behaviors of the sys-
tem with interleavings of all of the external events (e.g., smoke
detected) sensed by sensors and internal events (e.g., unlocked)
caused by apps’ behaviors. Even though the events are concurrent,
the interleaving is in fact reflected by the order of the (incoming)
events processed by event handlers, i.e., we can obtain the strict
concurrency by considering all order permutations of external and
internal events. However, this approach takes a very long verifi-
cation time as the number of events grow, and causes the state
space to explode. Instead, we can obtain a weaker concurrency by
considering the permutations of only external events in a sequen-
tial design shown in Algorithm 1. This implicitly assumes that
the internal events associated with an external event are handled
atomically in order. It is unclear if enforcing strict concurrency
would lead to the discovery of more unsafe states. We experiment
with the two design options with several small systems and find
that the sequential approach offering weak consistency, discovered
all violations that the strict concurrent model found. Based on this,
we use the sequential approach given that it significantly mitigates
the time complexity of execution.
The IoT system model in Promela:With the concurrent ap-
proach, each device and smart app is modeled by a process (i.e.,
proctype). There is also a process for generating the sensed and
environmental events. The processes communicate with each other
using message passing (i.e., chan). We use a single process for the
whole system with our sequential design, using inline methods to
model the behavior of devices and smart apps. The devices, smart
apps, and event generators, communicate via shared global vari-
ables.
Safety Properties: We seek to verify 45 properties of the fol-
lowing types:
• Free of conflicting commands [69]: When a single external event
happens, an actuator should not receive two conflicting com-
mands (e.g., both on and off) – (1 property).
• Free of repeated commands: When a single event happens, an
actuator should not receive multiple repeated commands of the
same type or with the same payload – (1 property). The latter
could indicate a potential DoS or replay attack.
• Safe physical states: Table 4 shows some sample safe physical
states that the user desires the system to satisfy. These kinds of
properties can be verified using linear temporal logic (LTL) [5] –
(38 properties). We envision that a more complete list will likely
be provided by safety regulations associatedwith the IoT industry
in the future.
• Free of other known suspicious app behaviors—security-sensitive
command and information leakage: Examples of security-sensitive
commands are unsubscribe (disabling an app’s functionality) and
creating fake events (e.g., an appmay generate a “smoke detected”
event when there is no smoke in the physical environment); we
raise violations when such commands are executed. Information
leakage can occur with sending SMS and using network interfaces.
When sending SMS is triggered, for instance, we check whether
the recipient matches with the configured phone number to
prevent leakage – (4 properties).
• Robustness to device/communication failure: An app should quickly
check that a command sent to an actuator was acted upon to be
robust to device and communication failures. Upon detecting a
failure, the app should notify users via SMS/Push messages. This
property can be verified using LTL as well – (1 property).
Note that we provide users with an interface to select the list
of safety properties they want to verify. Based on the device as-
sociation information (recall § 7) provided by the Configuration
Extractor, the LTL format of the selected properties are automati-
cally generated.
Example: Consider the smart home of a single owner Alice (say),
which comprises of a smart lock that controls the main door viz.,
Door Lock, and a presence sensor viz., Alice’s Presence (which
checks if Alice is at home). Assume that Alice installs two smart
apps: Auto Mode Change, which manages the location mode based
on the events from Alice’s Presence and, Unlock Door, which
unlocks the Door Lock based on explicit user input or a “location
mode” change event. When this system is analyzed by the model
checker, a violation is detected as described below.
Figure 7 shows the (filtered) violation log (a counter-example)
output by Spin. The format of each line in the violation log is as
follows: file name (SmartThings0.prom), line number, state number,
and the executed code. In particular, the counter example has the
following steps. (1) The event not present is generated by Alice’s
presence if Alice leaves home (line 1) and its subscribers are no-
tified of this state change (line 2). (2) The app Auto Mode Change
reads and processes this state change event (lines 3-5) and notifies
the location manager to change the location mode to Away (line
6). (3) The location manager changes its mode and notifies its sub-
scribers of this change (lines 7-8). (4) The app Unlock Door reads
and processes this mode change event (lines 9-10) and sends an
unlock command to the device Door Lock (line 11), which unlocks
the door (lines 12-13). Thus, the system enters an unsafe physical
state (i.e., the main door is unlocked when no one is at home) (lines
14-15).
Upon closer inspection, the description of Unlock Door suggests
that it unlocks the door only upon user input. However, in practice,
it also unlocks the door whenever the location mode changes (i.e.,
there is an inconsistency between the app’s description and its
implementation).
9 OUTPUT ANALYZER
The Output Analyzer attributes a violation to either a misconfigu-
ration or a malicious app using a heuristic-based algorithm. The
algorithm consists of two phases. In the first phase, when a user in-
stalls a new smart app, the output analyzer enumerates all possible
configurations for this app. It verifies if the user-defined properties
hold with each configuration independently. If the proportion of
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SmartThings0.prom:2690 (state 295) [generatedEvent.evtType = notpresent]
SmartThings0.prom:2609 (state 332) [g_STPresSensorArr.element[STPresSensorIndex].subNotifiers[index2] = g_STPresSensorArr.element[
                  STPresSensorIndex].subNotifiers[index2] + 1]
SmartThings0.prom:2725 (state 757) [((g_STPresSensorArr.element[AutoModeChange_people.element[0].gArrIndex].subNotifiers[
                  AutoModeChange_people.element[0].eventCountIndex] > 0))]
SmartThings0.prom:2728 (state 759) [g_STPresSensorArr.element[AutoModeChange_people.element[0].gArrIndex].subNotifiers[AutoModeChange_people
                  .element[0].eventCountIndex] = g_STPresSensorArr.element[AutoModeChange_people.element[0].gArrIndex].subNotifiers[AutoModeChange_people
                  .element[0].eventCountIndex] - 1]
SmartThings0.prom:1913 (state 937) [(!((location.mode == AutoModeChange_newMode)))]
SmartThings0.prom:2308 (state 1797) [ST_Command.evtType = Away]
SmartThings0.prom:2438 (state 1765) [location.mode = HandleLocationEvt_mode]
SmartThings0.prom:2451 (state 1788) [location.subNotifiers[index0] = location.subNotifiers[index0] + 1]
SmartThings0.prom:2704 (state 346) [((location.subNotifiers[UnlockDoor_location] > 0))]
SmartThings0.prom:2707 (state 348) [location.subNotifiers[UnlockDoor_location] = location.subNotifiers[UnlockDoor_location] - 1]
SmartThings0.prom:1832 (state 596) [ST_Command.evtType = unlock]
SmartThings0.prom:2357 (state 665) [HandleSTLockEvt_state = 48]
SmartThings0.prom:2553 (state 703) [g_STLockArr.element[m_JJJCTEMP_0.gArrIndex].currentLock = HandleSTLockEvt_state]
spin: _spin_nvr.tmp:3, Error: assertion violated
spin: text of failed assertion: assert(!(!((((g_STPresSensorArr.element[alicePresence_STPresSensor].currentPresence != 18)||(g_STLockArr.
                  element[doorLock_STLock].currentLock!=48))))))
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Figure 7: Example violation log (filtered).
violations (violation ratio) is greater than a predefined threshold
(e.g., 90%), the new smart app is attributed as a malicious app.
If this is not the case, in the second phase, the new app is verified
in conjunction with other apps that were previously installed by the
user. Again, all configurations are considered. If the violation ratio
is greater than a predefined threshold, the new app is attributed as a
bad app and a report is provided to the user. Otherwise, the violation
is attributed to misconfiguration and suggestions of safe configura-
tions with regards to the user defined properties are provided. If
there is no violation, a successful verification is reported.
10 EVALUATIONS
Our experiments (model checking) are performed on aMacBook Pro
with macOS Sierra, 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5, 16 GB 1867 MHz DDR3,
and 256 GB SSD. We check if there are violations of the properties
discussed in §8. We also look at other performance metrics such
as the running times, and the scale ratio (which quantifies the
reduction in the number of event handlers to be jointly verified) to
evaluate IotSan.
10.1 Test Cases and Configurations
We perform four different sets of experiments described below. The
first three examine the fidelity with which bad apps and config-
urations are identified. The last set evaluates the performance of
different design choices we make.
Market appswith expert configurations:We check the safety
properties with 150 apps (assuming they are benign) from the Smart-
Things’ market place [20, 79, 80]. We (the authors) came up with
independent configurations for the apps (based on common sense
with regards to how the apps may be used). To illustrate, consider
the app Virtual Thermostat, the required input to which is shown
in Figure 1. Assume that the following devices are deployed: (1)
one temperature sensor (myTempMeas), (2) one outlet to control
the heater (myHeaterOutlet), (3) one outlet to control the air condi-
tioner (myACOutlet), (4) one outlet to control the light in the living
room (livRoomBulbOutlet), (5) one outlet to control the light in
the bedroom (bedRoomBulbOutlet), (6) one outlet to control the
light in the bathroom (batRoomBulbOutlet), (7) one motion sensor
in the living room (livRoomMotion), and (8) one motion sensor
in the bathroom (batRoomMotion). Our configuration is as fol-
lows: myTempMeas for the temperature sensor (line 3 in Figure 1),
myACOutlet for “outlets" (line 7 in Figure 1), 75 as the “setpoint"
temperature if people are present (line 9 in Figure 1), livRoomMo-
tion for “motion" (line 12 in Figure 1), 10 “minutes" for turning off
the AC/heater when no motion is sensed (line 15 in Figure 1), 85 as
the “emergencySetPoint" temperature at which the AC is turned on
(to set) regardless of whether people are present (line 18 in Figure
1), and “cool" for “mode" (line 21 in Figure 1).
We randomly divide the 150 apps into six groups (25 apps per
group) with one configuration each, and feed them into IotSan.
Upon encountering a violation, we remove the minimum number
of the associated apps (e.g., if there are two apps causing conflicting
commands, we randomly remove one of them); we then iterate the
process. The experiment stops when no violation is detected. These
experiments are performed with and without device/communica-
tion failures.
Market apps with non-expert configurations: To eliminate
biases, we also conduct a user study where we request 7 indepen-
dent student volunteers to configure 10 groups of apps with the
assumption that they would deploy them at home. Each group com-
prises of about 5 related apps (as determined by our app dependency
analyzer). A group receives one configuration from each volunteer
and this leads to a total of 70 configurations. Our Office of Research
Integrity determined that there was no need to go through an IRB
approval process (since no private information is collected).
Malicious apps:We consider 25 malicious apps created in [52].
In this set, we find that only 9 apps are relevant to our evaluations
(e.g., affect the physical state and can be compiled correctly by the
SmartThings’ ownweb-based IDE). There are four apps that IotSan
cannot currently handle viz.,Midnight Camera, Auto Camera, Auto
Camera 2, and Alarm Manager, since they dynamically discover
and control the devices in the system; we will extend IotSan to
handle such apps in future work. We evaluate whether IotSan
correctly attributes these malicious apps when they are installed
together with other apps. The configurations of the 9 malicious
apps are identical to those in [52]. We also choose 11 potentially
bad apps (found via the previous experiments) from the market
place for a total of 20 bad apps. In conjunction, we select 10 good
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Light follow meNo motion
Light off when 
close
Good 
nightDoor 
close
After 10PM
Light 1 turned off Unlock doorEnter 
sleeping 
mode
Main door 
unlocked+
Light 2 turned off
(a) Example violation due to bad app interactions.
Main 
door 
locked
Darken 
behind me
No 
motion
Enter 
away 
mode
+
Light 
turned 
off
Switch 
change mode
Make 
it so
IntruderAlarm triggered and SMS sent
Door 
open
(b) Example violation due to a device failure. Dotted arrows are
expected events that do not occur due to the failure of themotion
sensor.
Figure 8: Violation examples: boxes depict apps and high
level abstractions are shown for inputs/outputs.
apps from the market place to create a reasonable input set. Here,
we specifically evaluate the fidelity of our attribution module.
Performance:We compare the performance of concurrent ver-
sus sequential design. We use two bad groups of apps viz., (Auto
Mode Change, Unlock Door) and (Brighten Dark Places, Let There
Be Dark), and one good group of apps viz., (Good Night, It’s Too
Cold) that control 3 switch devices, 3 motion sensors, and 1 tem-
perature measurement sensor.
10.2 Identifying Unsafe Configurations
Market apps with expert configurations: Table 5 summarizes
the results from our first set of experiments in the absence of device
and communication failures. The apps in parenthesis jointly cause
a violation. We find 38 violations of 11 properties, some of which
can be very dangerous from a user’s perspective. For example, there
is violation where “The main door is unlocked when people are
sleeping at night”, which involves 4 apps. The interactions between
the apps that lead to this violation is shown in Figure 8a: when
lights are turned off at night a mode change is initiated by the Good
Night app, which in turn causes the unsafe action of unlocking the
main door by the Unlock door app.
Device/communication failures cause violations of 9 additional
properties with some dangerous cases. One such case is showcased
in Figure 8b. When people leave home, the Make it so app should
automatically lock the entrance door; however, due to the failure of
the motion sensor, the Make it so app is not triggered and thus,
the door is left unlocked. Moreover, this failure also causes NO
notification to be sent to law enforcement upon physical intrusion.
An alarming discovery is that none of the analyzed apps check
if the commands sent to the actuators were actually carried out
(which might not be the case if the device has failed).
Market apps with non-expert configurations: The verifica-
tion results from the second set of experiments are in Table 6. From
10 groups of apps with 70 configurations, we find 97 violations of
10 properties. For example, the property “An AC and a heater are
both turned on” is violated by 21 configurations across 5 groups.
Note that in some configurations multiple properties are violated
and thus, the number of violations is more than the number of
configurations.
10.3 Violation Attribution
IotSan attributes all of the ContexIoT’s malicious apps [52] cor-
rectly when each is independently considered with violation ratios
of 100 % (recall §9). Two apps violated the information leakage
property as the command httpPost was executed. Two apps vio-
lated the “using security-sensitive command property", i.e., they
generated fake carbon monoxide detection events and an unsub-
scribe is executed. The remaining 5 apps violated safety properties
in the physical space, e.g., a main door is unlocked when no one is at
home and, when smoke is detected, a water valve switch is turned off.
From among the 11 market apps, 6 were detected with a 100% vio-
lation ratio, both when verified independently and in conjunction
with other apps; they were thus attributed as bad apps. The remain-
ing were attributed to cause violations (with 70% or lower violation
ratio) due to bad configurations (there existed safe configurations
with no violations).
10.4 Scalability
Table 7a shows the scalability benefits of our app dependency ana-
lyzer in the above experiments with 150 market apps. In this table,
“Original Size" is the total number of event handlers of a group and
“New Size" is the number of event handlers of the largest related set
after running the App Dependency Analyzer module. On average,
App Dependency Analyzer reduced the problem size by a factor 3.4x.
10.5 Concurrent vs. Sequential
Model checkers using both concurrent and sequential design de-
tected all violations within 1 second. Table 7b shows the runtimes
of the two models with a good group of apps (2 apps and 7 devices),
which does not violate any property. We see that sequential de-
sign significantly reduces the runtime of the verification. Note that
forever means the experiment ran for a week and then was forced
to stop. Moreover, we also verified the runtime of our sequential
approach with a much bigger system, which comprises of 5 related
apps and 10 devices and does not have any violation. As shown in
Table 8, the verification time for 10 events is about 5 hours, which
is quite reasonable for a laptop with limited computing resources.
11 DISCUSSION
Application to other IoT Platforms: For ease of exposition, our
narrative integrated some aspects of implementation specific to
SmartThings, when describing the design of IotSan. Conceptu-
ally, the design of IotSan applies to other IoT platforms. To illus-
trate, given its recent popularity we choose IFTTT (IF This Then
That [47]) [56, 63, 86] to show that this is the case. IFTTT is a task
automation platform for IoT deployments. An IFTTT rule (also
called applet) comprises of two main parts: “Trigger Service” (This)
and “Action Service” (That). To apply IotSan to IFTTT, most of the
modules (i.e., App Dependency Analyzer,Model Generator, and Out-
put Analyzer) can be reused almost as is; the relatively big change
will be in the Translator.
IFTTT to Java Translator: We use the crawler of [63] to fetch
the published applets from IFTTT website into a json file. We then
developed an IFTTT Handler in Java based on the org.json.simple
package to extract the subscribed device and event from the trigger
service, and the controlled device and expected command from
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Table 5: Verification results with market apps.
Violation type Number of viola-
tions
Example violated property Apps related to example
Conflicting commands 8 A light receives “on" and “off" simultaneously (Brighten Dark Places, Let There Be Dark)
Repeated commands 10 A light receives repeated “on” commands (Automated light, Brighten My Path)
Unsafe physical states 20
A heater is turned off at night when temperature is below a
predefined threshold
(Energy Saver)
Themain door is unlockedwhen people are sleeping at night (Light Follows Me, Light OffWhen Close, GoodNight, Unlock Door)
Table 6: Verification results with market apps, with volun-
teer configuration.
Violation type Number of violated prop-
erties
Number of viola-
tions
Conflicting commands 1 19
Repeated commands 1 12
Unsafe physical states 8 66
Table 7: (a) Scalability with dependency graphs. (b) Run-
times with concurrent and sequential design.
(a)
Group Original
Size
New
Size
Scale
Ratio
1 37 11 3.4
2 27 5 5.4
3 34 23 1.5
4 30 12 2.5
5 42 19 2.2
6 34 6 5.7
Mean scale ratio 3.4
(b)
Number
of
events
Concurrent Sequential
1 1s 1s
2 56.5s 1s
3 139m 1s
4 forever 1s
5 1s
6 4.2s
7 16.3s
Table 8: Verification time vs. number of events.
Number of events 6 7 8 9 10 11
Verification time 6.61s 50.9s 396s 49.83m 5.89h 23.39h
the action service of each IFTTT rule. The translation is relatively
simple. Each rule is considered as an app, which has only a single
event handler, in IotSan and is translated into a Java class. Each
event handler (i.e., a Java method) has only a single instruction
(i.e., the expected command); the subscribed device and controlled
device become class fields. Even though the technical details of
IFTTT Handler are somewhat different from SmartThings Handler,
the translation procedures are very similar (e.g., all Java objects and
grammars are exactly the same).
Minor changes in Model Generator: Each service is mapped
onto (modeled as) a sensor device(s) or an actuator device(s). We
have modeled 8 popular IoT-related services based on the events/ac-
tions they provides on the IFTTT website. For example, Amazon
Alexa [3] and Google Assistant are modeled as sensor devices; Nest
Thermostat is modeled as an actuator device. The difference is that
Samsung SmartThings inherently provides handlers for several
kinds of devices (e.g., outlet, lock, motion sensor, and contact sen-
sor). The change needed is to addmore device types to the collection
of modeled devices.
We have validated our basic IFTTT prototype implementation
with 10 IoT rules/applets (from [47]) assuming that all of these rules
are installed in a smart home. We perform limited experiments and
as shown in Table 9 (hyperlinks to a rule –e.g., rule #1 – can be seen
Table 9: Verification results with IFTTT rules.
Violated properties Related rules
Siren/strobe is not activated when intruder (i.e., motion) is
detected
(rule #1, rule #4),
(rule #3, rule #4)
Siren/strobe is activated when no intruder is detected (rule #2)
The main/front door is unlocked when no one is at home (rule #5), (rule #6)
A phone call is not triggered when intruder is detected (rule #7, rule #10),
(rule #8, rule #10)
by clicking on the rule), we find 7 violations of 4 unsafe physical
states.
Limitations:While our prototype of IotSan has been shown to
be very effective in identifying bad apps and unsafe configurations,
it has the following limitations. First, the Spin model checker has
a predefined threshold for the size of Promela code (and cannot
handle a file size greater than this). Depending on apps’ source
code sizes and dependencies among the apps, IotSan can handle
a system with about 30 apps. We assume that users are unlikely
to have many more than this today and will investigate further
scalability in the future. Second, we require smart apps to explicitly
subscribe to specific devices they want to control and cannot handle
smart apps that dynamically discover devices and interact with
them. Such apps are very dangerous since they can control any
device without permissions from users. Identifying such apps and
ensuring that they do not compromise the physical state is beyond
the scope of this effort. Third, in Algorithm 1, we let the model
checker enumerate all possible permutations of the event types;
thus, it may consider scenarios that are unlikely to happen in the
real world (e.g., the temperature is set to aminimumvalue in the first
iteration and set to a maximum value in the second one). However,
we include these scenarios to catch bad or malicious apps. If such
scenarios can be eliminated, the state explosion issue can be further
mitigated. Fourth, we do not explicitly model the behavior of the
physical environment after an actuator executes a command (e.g.,
the system temperature should increase after a heater is turned on).
However, such physical changes are implicitly covered by the way
the model checker exhaustively verifies a system. Fifth, the G2J
Translator currently does not support heterogeneous collections
(e.g., a list, array, or map that stores entries of different types) and
dynamic features (e.g., overloading operator and generic data types).
Note that most of the SmartThings apps do not use these features.
12 RELATEDWORK
IoT Security: Current research on IoT security can be roughly
divided into three categories that focus on devices [31, 40, 72],
protocols [32, 41, 58, 71], and platforms. There have been efforts ad-
dressing information leakage and privacy [8, 12, 14, 75, 91, 93], and
vulnerabilities of firmware images [22]. Fernandes et al., have re-
cently reported security-critical design flaws in the IoT permission
CoNEXT ’18, December 4–7, 2018, Heraklion, Greece Dang Tu Nguyen et al.
model that could expose smart home users to significant harm such
as break-ins [28]. To address these, several efforts [29, 52, 85, 89]
have proposed modifications to a smart app’s source code and the
platform, to enforce good behaviors of smart apps at run time. In
contrast, our work statically identifies possible violations of given
physical/cyber safety properties of IoT systems without requiring
any app modifications.
ModelChecking:Model checking has been used to verify system-
level threats [66–68] and basic correctness properties [15, 23, 56, 69]
of IoT systems. In contrast with these efforts, IotSan targets de-
veloping a practical platform for ensuring the physical safety of
today’s IoT systems. It not only addresses the practical challenges
(e.g., scale issues and making Groovy amenable to model checking)
in identifying configurations that violate user properties relating
to the physical state, but also addresses robustness (failures) and
security issues (malicious app attribution). Table 1 shows what
IotSan offers compared to the most related recent systems.
13 CONCLUSIONS
Badly designed apps, undesirable interactions between installed
apps and/or device/communication failures can cause an IoT system
to transition into bad states. In this paper, we design and proto-
type a framework IotSan that uses model checking as a basic
building block to identify causes for bad physical/cyber states and
provides counter-examples to exemplify these causes. IotSan ad-
dresses practical challenges such as alleviating state space explosion
with model checking, and automatic translation of app code into
a form amenable for model checking. Our evaluations show that
IotSan identifies many (sometimes complex) unsafe configurations,
and flags considered bad apps with 100% accuracy.
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